This paper establishes the generic niteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for Sender-Receiver cheap-talk games. An equilibrium in a Sender-Receiver cheap-talk game is said to be in reduced form if every message is used by at least one type and no two messages provoke the same response. It is shown that, for a generic set of utilities on outcomes, a Sender-Receiver cheap-talk game has a nite number of reduced form equilibria. A corollary is that, for generic utilities, the set of probability distributions over outcomes generated by equilibria isnite. Because of the identication of terminal nodes for utility purposes, Sard's theorem is not applicable in the way i t w as used in Kreps and Wilson (1982) , and a structurally dierent proof strategy is developed. Some additional characterization of the equilibria are obtained in the process of the proof.
Introduction
This paper establishes the generic niteness of equilibrium outcome distributions (these terms are claried below) in a simple class of \pure communication games," namely, games in which a privately informed \Sender" sends a utility-irrelevant message concerning her type to a \Receiver" who, upon receiving the message, takes an action. In this paper, messages do not aect utility and play only an informational signaling role. We dene \outcomes" to be type-action pairs; the space of outcomes is the domain of agents' utility functions. Given an extensive form game derived in the obvious way from a particular message space, multiple terminal nodes correspond to the same outcome if they dier only in their message components. Often called Sender-Receiver cheap-talk games, this class of games is introduced by Crawford and Sobel (1982) and is dierent from the signaling games studied in Cho and Kreps (1987) 1 in one respect: messages do not aect utility.
In this paper, a subset of a nite dimensional linear space is said to be \generic" if the complement is a nite union of semi-algebraic sets 2 whose closure has measure zero. An equilibrium in a Sender-Receiver cheap-talk game is said to be in reduced form if every message is used by at least one type and no two messages provoke the same response. It is shown that, for a generic subset of the space of utilities on outcomes, a Sender-Receiver cheap-talk game has a nite number of reduced form equilibria. Since every equilibrium has a reduced form reduction with the same outcome distribution, the conceptual essence of the paper follows as a simple corollary, namely, a Sender-Receiver cheap-talk game has a nite number of outcome distributions generated by equilibria.
Equilibrium theories explain the relationship between exogenous variables (given environment) and endogenous variables (determined by the theory) as solutions to a system of equations. In addition to the issue of the existence of a solution, one is concerned about the determinacy of the solution that a theory prescribes. In particular, if there are innitely many solutions in a small neighborhood of a point, the theory's explanation for the given situation is indeterminate at least near that point. Ideally, a theory provides 1 As they indicate in their paper, signaling games have been studied in various contexts prior to their paper. a completely determinate explanation if the endogenous variables are expressed as a continuous function of exogenous variables. But, both general equilibrium theory and game theory do not generally determine the solution in this way. H o w ever, if the hypotheses of the implicit function theorem are satised by the equilibrium conditions at each solution point, the ideal situation is realized locally: the solution is locally unique and is persistent under a small perturbation of exogenous variables. Therefore, the comparative statics provides unambiguous predictions of the theory on the eects of small variations in exogenous variables, and the implication of the theory is not invalidated by the possibility of a small error in exogenous variables.
In game theory, t ypically the determinacy of equilibria is investigated taking utilities as given variables, which is the point of view taken in this paper. In a nite game, the local uniqueness of equilibrium is equivalent to niteness of equilibria because the strategy space is compact. The most general result of nite equilibria is not obtainable because a continuum of equilibria always arises for special utilities (e.g, the same utility for every outcome). Hence, as in general equilibrium theory, a \generic" property is sought for.
In extensive form games, the behavior at unreached nodes may v ary without aecting the equilibrium conditions, giving rise to a continuum of equilibria. These variations are ineective in the sense that the variation part has no role in determining the terminal nodes reached by equilibria. Hence, for extensive form games, the determinacy of equilibrium probability distributions on terminal nodes is established by Kreps and Wilson (1982) . In pure communication games, the strategic meanings of messages are determined within equilibria according to how they are used, and because many messages may be used as \synonyms," equilibria are inherently indeterminate. This kind of indeterminacy is not present in previous studies on the determinacy of games in which e v ery move has a unique role. In this respect, the issue of determinacy in pure communication games has a special signicance pertaining to the utility-irrelevant and unveriable nature of language.
Generic niteness of equilibria was rst established by Debreu (1970) for pure exchange economies and the investigation followed for varied game forms. Harsanyi (1973) shows that a nite normal form game has an odd (hence, nite) number of equilibria for generic utilities on the set of pure strategy proles. 3 Kreps and Wilson (1982) resolves the issue for extensive form games; given an extensive form game, the set of probability distributions on the terminal nodes generated by Nash equilibria is nite for generic utilities on the set of terminal nodes.
However, games may h a v e sets of terminal nodes that are naturally regarded as a priori equivalent due to the nature of the phenomenon being modelled. For these games, the \relevant" utility space is a linear subspace of the utility space on all terminal nodes, and the Kreps and Wilson's result is not applicable. In this regard, McLennan (1991) investigates more general game forms in which terminal nodes are mapped to an outcome space to which utility is assigned. Although he establishes positive results for some special cases, McLennan presents an example that refutes the niteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for generic utilities when terminal nodes are mapped to mixed outcomes (probability distributions over pure outcomes). The case in which terminal nodes are mapped to pure outcomes is still an open question. Games involving pure communication (utility-irrelevant messages) are an interesting subclass of this case. This paper resolves the question for Sender-Receiver cheap-talk games which are simple forms of this subclass, with the hope of providing an insight to general pure communication games.
In a Sender-Receiver cheap-talk game, the outcome space is the product of the set of Sender types and the set of actions available to the Receiver. Hence, terminal nodes reached from the same type and same action (but dierent messages) are identied as the same outcome so that, for nontrivial message spaces, the dimension of the utility space of an agent is smaller than the number of terminal nodes. It turns out, therefore, Sard's theorem is not applicable here in the way i t w as used to prove generic niteness in Kreps and Wilson (1982) . A structurally dierent proof strategy is developed in this paper.
To facilitate the discussion of methodology, a description of the game is in order. Denote the probability space on a nite set S by (S) f p 2 I R S + : X s 2 S p s = 1 g ; and let (S) be the relative i n terior of (S): A Sender-Receiver cheap-talk game is represented by = ( A ; T ; ; u ; v ) where A is a nite set of actions available for the Receiver, T is a nite set of the Sender types, 2 (T) is the prior belief of the Receiver on the distribution of Sender types and u 2 IR AT and v 2 IR AT are the utilities of the Sender and the Receiver, respectively. 4 The characteristics (A; T; ) is called a game form.
Let M be a nite message space. 5 A talking strategy of the Sender is a function : T ! (M), and an action strategy of the Receiver is a function : M ! (A): A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies (;) that satises i) given , each t ype sends only those messages that induce the highest expected utility for that type, and ii) for each message, prescribes a best response of the Receiver based on the Bayesian updating of the beliefs under . Throughout the paper, an equilibrium refers to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In fact, the properties that we exploit to establish the main result are weaker than the full implication of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium; the \best response" property o f the Sender is not exploited. Hence, the result we get is somewhat stronger in the sense that it applies to a weaker concept than a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
In a game , the set of outcomes is dened to be A T. The outcome distribution generated b y ( ;) is the probability that each outcome is reached when the game is played according to (;). The subject of this paper is the cardinality of outcome distributions generated by equilibria of the game for generic utilities (u; v).
The function of messages is to induce certain responses from the Receiver by aecting the belief (of the Receiver). In this sense, messages are strategically equivalent if they induce the same response. Also, unused messages play no role in determining outcome distribution. A reduced form equilibrium (as dened earlier) is without these kinds of redundancy of messages. As is discussed in section 2, an equilibrium that is not in reduced form can be transformed to a reduced form equilibrium with the same outcome distribution by eliminating unused messages and identifying messages provoking the same response. Hence, we restrict our attention to reduced form equilibria. The main theorem of this paper 4 An alternative representation of a utility of either agent is a linear function from IR A to IR T . 5 Every result of this paper is easily seen to hold for a countably innite message space also.
states that for generic utilities there are only a nite number of reduced form equilibria. It is an immediate corollary of this theorem that, for generic utilities, there are a nite number of outcome distributions generated by B a y esian Nash equilibria.
Consider an equilibrium (;) of a game . For each message used according to , the bisupport of the message is a pair consisting of the set of types that use that message with a positive probability (\type component"), and the set of actions that are used with a positive probability in response to that message (\action component"). The conguration determined by an equilibrium is the collection of bisupports of all used messages. We s a y an equilibrium is in the conguration that it determines and an outcome distribution is consistent with a conguration if it is generated by an equilibrium in that conguration. We will investigate all possible congurations and outcome distributions that are consistent with these congurations.
Next, let us consider a certain conguration. The expected utility v ectors of the Sender induced by equilibria in that conguration, are shown to be contained in a certain ane subspace 6 determined by the conguration and the utility of the Sender. The generic dimension of this ane subspace is the main task of section 4. The results are obtained for all congurations necessary for our purpose; results are established for a special class of congurations rst and are extended to more general classes. In section 5, congurations with positive v alues of the above mentioned generic dimension are investigated of their compatibility with generic utilities of the Receiver from the viewpoint of Green and Osband (1991) , and the main theorem is established.
This rather long proof produces some additional implications for Sender-Receiver cheap-talk games.
It is shown that, for generic utilities, every reduced form equilibrium uses at most as many messages as the number of Sender types. This observation works as a rationale for the assumption of a nite message space widely adopted in communication literature. In fact, the message space may be reduced down to the number of Sender types for the purpose of nding reduced form equilibria for generic utilities. Moreover, generically, every conguration has at most one reduced form equilibrium in it, and a relatively small 6 See subsection 2.2 for a denition of ane subspace. 5 number of congurations consisting of # T or less bisupports may h a v e reduced form equilibria in them. This information may be useful in the exercise of computing equilibria. Third implication is that, for each game form, there is an upper bound for the number of equilibrium outcome distributions that applies for generic utilities.
The essential feature of Sender-Receiver cheap-talk games is the coordination between two players on the information that the language transmits. The question of how the coordination is nally reached is an important issue which this paper does not address. However, the coordination may be expected to be easier to reach if there are only a nite number of \rational" ways of using the language, particularly near an equilibrium point. This remark, however, is to be understood as a naive observation due to the lack of coordination process specication on the one hand and the highly complex nature of human language on the other.
Section 2 presents a formal framework and a comprehensive outline of the analysis. Section 3 illustrates a simple 2-type case to give a basic idea of the more complex general analysis that ensues. A discussion of semi-algebraic sets and ane subspaces is also in section 3.
Main Results and Analytic Framework

Reduced form equilibria and main results
In this subsection, Bayesian Nash equilibria and reduced form equilibria are formally dened and the main results of this paper is stated.
Given a set of Sender types T and a set of actions A, the following notation will be used: u 2 IR AT is a tuple (u a ) a2A where u a 2 IR T is the utility v ector of all possible types of Sender induced by action a. Alternatively where supp represents the support. In this paper, an equilibrium refers to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
As discussed earlier, unused messages and multiple messages that provoke the same response give rise to redundancy of messages. Recall that an equilibrium (;) is in reduced form if every message is used and (m) 6 = (m 0 ) for any t w o distinct messages m and m 0 .
As the next lemma implies, we only need to consider reduced form equilibria to show the generic niteness of equilibrium outcome distributions. This denition is equivalent to the sequential equilibria for Sender-Receiver cheap-talk games; the additional requirement of the sequential equilibrium is the \consistency" of the belief (o equilibrium). Since every information set is directly reachable from every initial node, any belief specication at unreached nodes is implementable with \negligible" changes in the beliefs of reached nodes.
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of equivalence classes of all used messages in M. This is a situation where messages that provoke the same response are identied as a single message. The original behavior of the agents is still in equilibrium after the identication; the Sender's optimality is immediate and the Receiver's optimality is preserved by the \sure thing principle." By construction, it is in reduced form and the outcome distribution is not aected by the identication.
Given a game form (A; T; ), the space of utilities of the agents of the game is commonly IR AT . T o distinguish between the Sender and the Receiver, let U denote the utility space of the Sender and V denote that of the Receiver. The goal of this paper is to show that for generic (u; v) in the utility space U V , the game = (A; T; ; u ; v ) has a nite number of outcome distributions that are generated by B a y esian Nash equilibria. This goal is accomplished by i n v estigating the reduced form equilibria in every possible conguration. In fact, we establish a stronger generic characterization of the reduced form equilibria in relation to the congurations that they determine; according to certain criteria, each conguration either generically has no reduced form equilibrium in it or generically has at most one reduced form equilibrium in it. The precise characterizatrion and criteria are developed in later sections. In this subsection, the principal characterization of reduced form equilibria are stated in Theorem 2.2, from which the generic niteness conclusion (Theorem 2.3 and Corollary 2.4) is deduced. Corollary 2.4: Given a game form (A; T; ) , there is a generic subset G of U V such that, for all (u; v) 2 G, the set of outcome distributions that are generated by B a y esian Nash equilibria of (A; T; ; u ; v )is nite.
Analytic framework
This subsection formalizes the analytic framework for the investigation of reduced form equilibria in each conguration, and explains the outline of the analysis that establishes Theorem 2.2.
A formulation of congurations is in order for further discussion. Prior to that, we make t w o observations on the congurations determined by equilibria. First, if a conguration is determined by an equilibrium, every type belongs to the type component o f a t least one bisupport because every type uses at least one message. This means that the union of type components of all bisupports in the conguration is the whole set of Sender types. Hence, we only need to investigate congurations with this property. Secondly, w e show in next two Lemmas that, for generic utilities, no reduced form equilibrium determine a conguration with two identical bisupports. This observation simplies notation for congurations in the subsequent discussion.
Lemma 2.5: Given a game form (A; T; ) , there is a generic subset F of V such that, for all v 2 F, # BR(p;v) # supp(p) for all p 2 (T).
Proof: Because a nite intersection of generic sets is generic, it suces to show that for generic v, # BR(p;v) # T for all p 2 (T). Let k = # T. To show that the proposed property is violated only in a negligible set, consider the set fv 2 V : p v a 1 = p v a 2 = =pv a k +1 for some p 2 (T)g 9 where a 1 ; : : : ; a k +1 are distinct actions. Notice this set satises
where v a is a row v ector. Since p 6 = 0, the above equality implies that the matrix on the left hand side is singular. Therefore, the above dened set is a negligible set. Since there are a nite number of collections of k + 1 distinct actions, the proof is complete.
Lemma 2.6: Given a game form (A; T; ) , there is a generic subset G of U V such that, for all (u; v) 2 G, no reduced form equilibrium of (A; T; ; u ; v )determines a conguration that has two identical bisupports.
Proof: Suppose an equilibrium determines a conguration with two identical bisupports consisting of A A and T T such that # A # T :(By Lemma 2.6, we only need to consider these bisupports.) Denote the two messages corresponding to this bisupport by m and m 0 . Let u T 2 IR T denote the equilibrium expected utility v ector for Sender types in T. Since every type in T uses both m and m 0 , the expected utility of Sender types in T from the responses to m and m 0 should be u T . H o w ever, the set of all expected utility vectors for Sender types in T that can be realized by responses mixed over A, is the convex hull of the utility v ectors of all actions in A for Sender types in T. (These utility v ectors are elements of IR T .) Since # A # T, these utility v ectors are linearly independent for generic utilities. Therefore, for generic utilities, there is a unique response mixed over A that induces the equilibrium expected utility v ector for T (u T ), which in turn means that the responses to m and m 0 are the same. This contradicts to the equilibrium being in reduced form . Therefore, we conclude that, for generic utilities, there is no reduced form equilibrium in a conguration that has two copies of the bisupport (A; T). Since there are nitely many distinct bisupports and a nite intersection of generic sets is generic, the proof is complete.
Due to Lemma 2.6, for generic utilities, every reduced form equilibrium determines a conguration consisting of distinct bisupports. In this respect, we only consider congurations with this property in the remainder of the paper, and a conguration always refers to a conguration with this property unless otherwise indicated. Accordingly, the following formulation of congurations comprises only these congurations. Denition 2.7 : Given underlying sets of actions A and of Sender types T, a bisupport on fA; Tg is a pair (A; T) where A (called action component) is a nonempty subset of A, and T (called type c omponent) is a nonempty subset of T. A c onguration C on fA; Tg is a nonempty set of bisupports on fA; Tg. When the underlying sets of actions and Sender types are obvious, we will omit specication of them. A subconguration of C is a nonempty subset of C. The cardinality of a conguration C, # C, is the number of bisupports in C. A conguration C on fA; Tg is just if # A # T for every bisupport (A; T) in C and [ C T = T. Remark 2.8 : In light of Lemma 2.5, we only need to consider congurations such that # A # T for every bisupport (A; T). Moreover, since every type uses at least one message, every equilibrium determines a conguration such that the union of all type components is the set of all Sender types. Therefore, we only need to consider just congurations.
Given a game from (A; T; ), our agenda is to show that, for generic utilities, only a nite number of congurations have reduced form equilibria in them and moreover, these congurations have only a nite number of reduced form equilibria in them. We focus on two necessary conditions that a conguration C should satisfy if, for a certain utility (u; v), there is a reduced form equilibrium in it. Condition (SO) below is necessary for the optimality of the Sender and (RO) is necessary for that of the Receiver. By an expectation vector of the Sender, we mean a vector of expected utility levels of the Sender (one level for each t ype) from a certain action strategy of the Receiver. The space of expectation vectors of the Sender is IR T . 8 (SO) There is an expectation vector u 2 IR T (to be regarded as an equilibrium expected utility v ector) of the Sender with the following property; for each bisupport (A; T) in C, there is a response ((A; T)) mixed over A such that ((A; T)) u t = u t for all t 2 T.
(RO) There is a talking strategy : T ! (C) such that, for all (A; T) 2 C , the following properties hold; i) t ((A; T)) > 0 if and only if t 2 T, and ii) A BR(h ((A; T)); v).
(Since each bisupport corresponds to a message used in an equilibrium, the conguration is identied as the message space.)
These conditions are weaker than the optimality conditions of the agents because the \best response" property of Sender is not incorporated. Hence, conclusions derived from these two conditions (as are the results of this paper) are actually stronger than the results stated in subsection 2.1. But, it may be of purely mathematical interest. (IV) For generic utilities, there is at most one strategy pair (;)that satises (OS) and (OR) with respect to C.
To develop criteria for classifying congurations into four categories above, we need some terminology and notation: Let X be a subset of a nite dimensional linear space L. An ane combination of points x 1 ; : : : ; x n in X is 1 x 1 + + n x n where j 2 IR and P n j=1 j = 1 : The ane hull of X is dened as H(X) f z 2 L : z is an ane combination of points in Xg:
An ane subspace of L is a subset of L closed under ane combination. It is easy to see that an ane subspace is the ane hull of a nite subset (possibly empty) of L, and vice versa. 9 The ane hull of X, H(X), needs to be distinguished from span(X): span(X) f z 2 L : z is a linear combination of points in Xg: 9 Notice also that an ane hull is either empty or a linear subspace translated by a v ector.
Recall the space of expectation vectors of the Sender is IR T where T is the set of Sender types. For a nonempty subset T of T, let IR T = fx 2 IR T : x t = 0 for all t 6 2 Tg and let T : IR T ! IR T be the natural projection. The induced utility plane of a bisupport (A; T) for a utility u 2 IR AT is the ane hull of utility v ectors u a ; a 2 A , extended along the utility directions of Sender types that does not use the message that this bisupport represents, i.e, 1 T T (H(u A )) (2:c) where u A = fu a : a 2 Ag. The induced utility plane of a conguration C for a utility u, denoted by P(C; u), is the intersection of induced utility planes of bisupports in C.
Obviously, these induced utility planes are ane subspaces of IR T .
The induced utility plane of a bisupport (A; T) for u is the set of expectation vectors such that the utility levels of types in T can be realized by a response mixed over A.
Therefore, the induced utility plane of a conguration C for u contains the set of all expectation vectors that satisfy optimality condition (SO) with respect to C. Hence, by investigating the size of the induced utility plane of a conguration, we can check whether it may satisfy (SO) and if it does, how large the set of expectation vectors that satisfy (SO) may be. This is done extensively in section 4.
For a generic u, the dimension of the induced utility plane of each bisupport (A; T) i n C is # A + # T c 1 as long as it does not exceed # T, where T c is the complement o f T in T.
We dene the -value of a conguration to depict the typical dimension of the intersection of arbitrarily chosen ane subspaces of these dimensions in IR T .
Denition 2.9: For a conguration C on fA; Tg, dene
A conguration C is said to be taut if (2:e) is fullled as an equality of a strictly positive number. If C is unstretched otherwise, it is said to be loose. I f (2:e) is violated, C is said to be stretched. A conguration C is trim if every subconguration of C is unstretched.
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The induced utility plane of each bisupport in a conguration C contains
, the ane hull of utility v ectors of actions in \ C A extended along the utility directions of Sender types in ([ C T) c . Roughly said, a conguration is stretched if this ane subspace is generically of higher dimension than the above mentioned typical dimension (-value). A conguration is taut if this ane subspace is generically of the typical dimension. It turns out that a just conguration is classied into one of the four categories set before, depending on the -value and whether it is trim. These criteria are summarized below and developed in the rest of the paper.
Criteria for Categorization: Given a game form (A; T; ) , let C be a just conguration on fA; Tg.
(
C1) If C is not trim, it is in category (I). (C2) If C is trim and (C) < 0, it is in category (II). (C3) If C is trim and (C) > 0, it is in category (III). (C4) If C is trim and (C) = 0 , it is in category (IV).
Since there are a nite number of just congurations, generic niteness of reduced form equilibria immediately follows from this criteria.
A Preliminary Discussion
Before going into the technical details of the proof of the main theorem, subsection 3.1 presents an illustration of the basic idea in a simple 2-type case. Subsection 3.2 discusses some basic results about semi-algebraic sets.
A simple two-type case
To h a v e basic idea of the proof of the main theorem in a simple context, let us look at the 2-type case. Let (A; f1; 2g; ) b e a g i v en game form. According to Remark 2.8, we only need to consider equilibria in just congurations.
Consider equilibria in a conguration consisting of only one bisupport. This means that only one message is used and the posterior belief induced by this message is . F or generic utilities for the Receiver, however, there is a unique pure best response for . Hence, there is a unique equilibrium in a conguration of this kind.
Next, consider equilibria in a conguration consisting of two or more bisupports. Recall that the messages represented by bisupports that we consider are of the following kinds; (class 1) messages sent b y one type and responded by a pure action, (class 2) messages sent b y both types and responded by a pure action, and (class 3) messages sent by both types and responded by a mixed response over two actions. The induced utility plane of these three kinds of bisupports are of the following form in IR 2 (the space of expectation vectors of the Sender), respectively; a vertical or horizontal line through the utility v ector of a pure action, the utility v ector of a pure action itself, and a straight line through two utility v ector of two pure actions.
From this sketchy description of the induced utility planes, it is easy to see that the intersection of the induced utility planes of two distinct bisupports is generically at most a singleton, and that of three distinct bisupports is generically empty unless these three bisupports share a common action. If three bisupports share a common action, say a, the intersection of induced utility planes is generically the utility v ector of a itself. This means that the responses to these three messages is identical (the pure response of playing a) so that every equilibrium in this conguration (if exists) is not in reduced form. Therefore, generically there is no reduced form equilibrium in congurations with three or more distinct bisupports.
It remains to consider congurations with two bisupports. There are two cases. One case is one bisupport of the conguration represents a message in (class 2); sent b y both types but responded by a pure action, say b. In this case, the induced utility plane of this bisupport is the utility v ector of the action b itself and the intersection of induced utility planes is generically empty unless b is shared by both bisupports. But if b is shared, the responses to these messages are identical and every equilibrium in this conguration (if exists) is not in reduced form. The other case is both bisupports of the conguration represent messages in (class 1) or (class 3). Then, the intersection of induced utility planes is generically a singleton, say u = ( u 1 ; u 2 ). If there is an equilibrium in this conguration, the equilibrium expected utility of the Sender is u . For each bisupport, generically, there is a unique response that is consistent u in the following sense; the response mixes over the action component and induces expected utility u t to type t Sender if t is in the type component of the bisupport. It still remains to check h o w many dierent talking strategies are consistent with this conguration. A message in (class 1) obviously generates a trivial posterior concentrated on the type that sends the message. For generic utilities, the posterior generated by a message in (class 3) is unique because two actions are indierent only for one posterior. Hence, for generic utilities, the two posteriors generated by the two messages used in this kind of conguration are distinct and uniquely determined so that there is at most a unique talking strategy that implements this pair of posteriors given the prior. Conclusively, for generic utilities, there is at most one pair of talking and action strategies that satises (SO) and (RO) with respect to this kind of conguration.
Since there are a nite number of dierent congurations consisting of two distinct bisupports, we showed for two t ype case that there are at most a nite number of reduced from equilibria for generic utilities. Observe that the analysis depended on the common actions and the dimension of induced utility planes. This idea will be generalized to set criteria to categorize congurations.
Semi-algebraic sets
A semi-algebraic set is a nite union of sets in IR n of the form fx 2 IR n : P(x) = 0 and Q 1 (x) > 0 and : : :and Q J (x) > 0g; where P and Q 1 ; : : : ; Q J are polynomials in x 1 ; : : : ; x n with real coecients. 10 Since a weak inequality relation is a union of an equality relation and a strict inequality relation, semi-algebraic sets may be dened by w eak inequalities as well. It is clear from the denition that the class of semi-algebraic sets is closed under nite unions and intersections, complementation and (topological) closure. Remark 3.1 explains a guide to identify semialgebraic subsets for our purpose, and Lemma 3.2 presents a criterion for a semi-algebraic subset S to be negligible (equivalently, for the complement o f S to be generic).
Remark 3.1: The Tarski-Seidenberg theorem asserts that every rst order formula is equivalent to a rst order formula without quantiers. According to this theorem, a subset of IR n is semi-algebraic if it is dened by polynimial (in)equalities supplemented by quantiers. (The implication of the Tarski-Seidenberg theorem is far more powerful than this. See Benedetti and Risler (1990) for the Tarski-Seidenberg theorem and its exploitation.) The subsets of utilities of importance in this paper admit the following characterization: there exist (exactly) a certain number of linearly independent v ectors (these are quantiers) determined by the utility through polynomial inequalities. Since certain determinants vanishing or not is equivalent to certain polynomial (in)equalities, these subsets of utilities are semi-algebraic. Proof: This is an immediate corollary of Whitney (1957) which basically asserts that every semi-algebraic set is decomposed into a nite number of disjoint, connected semi-algebraic manifolds. (See also Benedetti and Risler (1990) for stratication.)
We close this section by identifying a certain class of functions that maps a generic set to a generic set. Lemma 3.3: Let f : X ! Y be a surjective submersion that maps any semi-algebraic set to a semi-algebraic set. Then, f(G) Y is generic if G X is generic.
Proof: We need to show that the complement o f f ( G ) is negligible. Since f(G) is semialgebraic, it suces to show that the complement has no interior. Suppose on the contrary that Z is a nonempty open set contained in the complement o f f ( G ). Then, f 1 (Z) i s contained in the complement o f G . Moreover, since f is continuous and surjective, f 1 (Z) is a nonempty open set. This is a contradiction to G being generic.
Remark 3.4: The condition in Lemma 3.3 that F maps any semi-algebraic set to a semialgebraic set, is needed because we required a generic subset to be semi-algebraic. In fact, Lemma 3.3 is applied later to rational functions.
Generic Dimension of the Induced Utility Plane
This section investigates the generic dimension of the induced utility plane of various sorts of congurations. In light of Remark 2.8, only just congurations are considered. As discussed in subsection 4.3, the results in this section establish (C1), (C2) and a somewhat weaker version of (C4) in the Criteria of Categorization as stated at the end of section 2. Complete establishment of the Criteria is done in section 5.
Congurations are classied as in Denition 4.1, and the results are established for a special class of congurations rst and are extended to more general classes. A cacophonous conguration is generated by an equilibrium in which e v ery type uses every message and an annexed conguration is generated by an equilibrium in which some particular action is used in response to every message. The proof of the proposition for cacophonous congurations uses a double induction: the primary induction is on the cardinality of conguration and within each primary induction, secondary induction is employed on the smallest action component of all bisupports. In the induction process, we derive information on the given conguration by i n v estigating certain variants of the given conguration. Next two Lemmas provide preliminary results on these variants. Since C is annexed, \ C 00 A 6 = ; so that C 00 being loose implies # (\ C 00 A) (C 00 ; T). By (4:d), # (\C 00 A) (C 00 ; T) + 1, which implies thatC 00 is unstretched. If b 6 2 \ C A, then \CA = \ C A while (C; T) = ( C ; T ) 1. Hence, if C is loose,C is unstretched. If C is stretched or is taut,C is stretched.
Proof of Proposition 4.2 for cacophonous congurations : Recall the induced utility plane of (A; T) i s H ( u A ) so that P(C; u) = \ C H ( u A ). Let A 0 be a smallest action component, that is, # A # A 0 for all (A; T) 2 C . Let C A 0 = C n f ( A 0 ; T ) g :
Step 1 Step 3: 2 # C # T + 1 and 1 < # A 0 # T. H(u A ) = H ((uj (xnb) ) A ) for all x 2 H(u A ) n H(u Anfbg ) (4:f)
Since it is assumed that b 6 2 \ C A,Ĉ b is trim. Hence, for u 2 G (A;T) , dim P(Ĉ b ; u) = dim P(C b ; u) 1 so that P(C b ; u) n P(Ĉ b ; u) is a generic subset of P(C b ; u). It is clear that 11 That is, uj xnb 2 U such that (uj xnb ) b = x and (uj xnb ) b 0 = u b 0 for all b 0 6 = b.
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(P(C b ; u) n P(Ĉ b ; u)) (H(u A ) n H(u Anfbg )). Therefore, by ( 4 :f), [u 
Since this is true for each bisupport, P(C b ; u) x === P(C b ;u) P(C b ; uj (xnb) ) i f u 2 \ C ( G ( A;T) ). As a nite intersection of generic sets, \ C (G (A;T) ) is generic in U and the proof is complete. By Lemma 4.6, we can nd x 6 2 H(u) arbitrarily close to u b such that P(C b ; u) = P ( C b ; u j ( x n b ) ) so that P(C A 0 ; u) = P ( C A 0 ; u j ( x n b ) ). Because b 6 2Ã 0 , this means that H(uj (xnb) ) = H ( u ). Hence, x = ( u j ( x n b ) ) b 6 2 H(uj (xnb) ) so that uj (xnb) 6 2 U H . This contradicts u being an interior point o f U H . Now, return to the main proof and suppose C is not loose. By Lemma 4.5 (b) ,C is stretched and P(C; u) Using this, we will show P(C; u) u === U P(C; u). Clearly, P(C; u) P(C; u). Suppose that P(C; u) has a point z 6 2 P(C; u). This means that z 2 P(C A 0; u) and z = x+ (1 ) By (4:g), this is not possible generically, and we conclude that P(C; u)
If C is taut, (C; T) = # \ C A 1 so that dim P(C; u) u === U (C; T). If C is stretched, there is nothing more to prove. This completes the proof of Proposition 4.2 for cacophonous congurations.
We extend the proof to annexed congurations which are not cacophonous; From the given conguration, we construct a cacophonous conguration about the induced utility plane of which w e h a v e information. Then, we nd a relationship between the induced utility plane of the constructed conguration and that of the original one, which leads to the conclusion.
Proof of Proposition 4.2 for congurations that are not cacophonous : Let a 0 2 \ C A . In light of Remark 4.3, we shall prove Proposition 4.2 with respect to U 0 = fu 2 U : u a 0 = 0 g . First, construct the following conguration on fA [ T;Tg from C:
The relevant utility space for C ca is U ca 0 = U 0 IR TT . Clearly, C ca is annexed and cacophonous. Since C is in reduced form, # A # T for all (A; T) 2 C . Therefore, # A + # T c # T for all (A [ T c ; T) 2 C ca , which means that C ca is just. Moreover, it is immediate from the denition of -value that (C) = ( C ca ), and a subconguration of C ca is unstretched if and only if the corresponding subconguration of C is unstretched. We complete the proof by constructing L as described above. For each t 2 T, let e t 2 IR T be a unit vector whose coordinate value is 1 for t and 0 elsewhere. Let e 2 IR TT be such that e t = e t for all t 2 T. Let IR TT be a small neighborhood of e such that, for all ! 2 , f! t : t 2 Tg form a basis for IR T . Dene L : U 0 ! U 0 b y L ( u; !) = ! 1 u (4:h) We need to show that L satises the properties i) and ii) assumed above. Since L(; ! ) : U 0 ! U 0 is simply a nonsingular change of coordinate system expressed by ! 1 , which itself is a smooth function of !, L(; ) is a surjective submersion. Moreover, L(; )
is a matrix of rational functions so that the image of a semi-algebraic set is semi-algebraic. Therefore, by Lemma 3. is P(C ca ; ( u; !)) transformed by ! 1 . Since ! 1 is a nonsingular linear transformation, dim P(C; L(u; !)) = dimP(C ca ; ( u; !)).
Non-annexed congurations
In this subsection, we i n v estigate the induced utility planes of non-annexed congurations. Earlier, we argued that if a conguration C on fA; Tg is induced by an equilibrium of (A; The main idea of the proof is as follows. We construct a hypothetical conguration with an articial action a 0 common to all bisupports in a game form with one more type. The hypothetical conguration is annexed by construction, so we h a v e information about the induced utility planes of this conguration by Proposition 4.8. From this, we derive information about the induced utility planes of the original conguration.
Formally, let T E = T [ f t 0 g and A E = A [ f a 0 g for some a 0 6 2 A and t 0 6 2 T, and dene a new conguration C E on fT E ; A E g, the annexation of C, a s 
27
(i) C E is just and every proper subconguration of C E is unstretched, and (ii) C E is trim if and only if (C; T) 1 . Proof: Since C is just, # A # T for all (A; T) 2 C so that # (A [ f a 0 g ) # ( T [ f t 0 g ). Clearly, the union of all type components of C E is T E . Hence, C E is just.
Clearly, a subconguration of C E is the annexation of a subconguration of C. Let C 0E denote the annexation of C 0 C . Then, C 0E has exactly one more common action, a 0 , than C 0 . On the other hand, (C 0E ; T E ) = ( C 0 ; T ) + 1 b y Lemma 4.10 (i). Therefore, from the denition of \unstretched" (Denition 2.8), C 0E is unstretched if (C 0 ; T) 1.
If C 0E is a proper subconguration, C 0 is also a proper subconguration of C so that (C 0 ; \ C T) 1. By Lemma 4.10 (ii), (C 0 ; T) = ( C 0 ; \ C T ) + # ( \ C 0 T c ) 1 and C 0E is unstretched. So, (i) is proved.
Next consider C E itself. Clearly from construction, fa 0 g is the only common action of all bisupports of C E and the union of all type components of C E is T E . Hence, from Denition 2.8, C E is unstretched if and only if (C) 1. This proves (ii).
Lemma 4.12: Let C be a conguration as described in Proposition 4.8 and C E be the annexation. Then, C E [ f ( f a 0 g ; T ) g is trim if (C; T) 1 . Proof: Subcongurations of C E are unstretched by Lemma 4.11. Now, consider a conguration of the form C 0E [f(fa 0 g;T)gwhere C 0E is the annexation of C 0 C . Clearly, a 0 is the only common action to this conguration. Moreover, from construction of C E , the union of all type components of this conguration is T E . So, to show that this conguration is unstretched, we need to show (C 0E [ f ( f a 0 g ; T ) g ; T E ) + 1 1. This is immediate for C 0 = C from the hypothesis that (C; T) 1. To examine C 0 6 = C, observe that, by Lemma 4.10 (i) Proof of Proposition 4.8 (a): Let C be a conguration as described in Proposition 4.8 (a) and C E ; U; U E 0 and e IR T be as explained above. First we will prove the result using a hypothetical function as described below, after which w e complete the proof by constructing . For congurations with nonnegative -values, we will check whether P(C E ; u )I R T b y comparing dim P(C E ; u) and dim(P (C E ; u ) \I R T ); if they dier P(C E ; u )6 IR T . H o wever, since IR T is the induced utility plane of (fa 0 g; T), P(C E ; u )\I R T is the induced utility plane of C E [ f ( f a 0 g ; T ) g .
If (C) 0, C E and C E [ f ( f a 0 g ; T ) g are trim by Lemmas 4.11 and 4.12 . By Proposition 4.2 applied to both, there exists a generic set of utilities G O such that dim P(C E ; u )= ( C E ; T E ) and dim(P (C E ; u )\I R T ) = ( C E [ f ( f a 0 g ; T ) g ; T E ) for all u 2 G. By Lemma 1.2 (i), (C E [ f ( f a 0 g ; T ) g ; T E ) = ( C E ; T E ) + # T ( # T + 1 ) = ( C E ; T E ) 1. This means that P(C E ; u )6 IR T for all u 2 G. By Lemmas 4.9 (c) and 4.10 (i), dim P(C; u) = ( C E ; T E ) 1 = ( C ; T ) for all u in (G) which is a generic subset of U by property ii) of . This completes the proof of Proposition 4.8 (a) if there exists as described above. If C 00 is unstretched, LHS of (2:e) RHS of (2:e) for C 00 . Hence, by ( 4 :n) and (4:o), the relation holds for C 00 j ([ C 0 T) also. Next, if C 00 is stretched, \ C 00 A = ; and [ C 00 T = [ C 0 T, then LHS of (2:e) is 0 for C 00 j ([ C 0 T) so that it is trivially unstretched.
The remaining possibility i s C 00 is stretched but either \ C 00 A 6 = ; or [ C 00 T 6 = [ C 0 T. Since C 00 is stretched, LHS of (2:e) > RHS of (2:e) for C 00 . In this case, however, LHS of (2:e) is positive for C 00 j ([ C 0 T) . Hence, by ( 4 :n) and (4:o), LHS of (2:e) > RHS of (2:e) for C 00 j ([ C 0 T) . This completes the proof. 
Implication
Recall Remark 2.8 which justied that we only need to consider just congurations.
Given a game form (A; T; ), let C be a just conguration on fA; Tg and let U = IR AT . First, suppose C is trim. Then, the generic dimension of the induced utility plane of C is (C; T) b y Propositions 4.2 (a) or 4.8 (a) unless C is non-annexed and (C 0 ; [ C 0 T) < 1 for a proper subconguration C 0 . In the latter case, P(C; u) u === U ; by Proposition 4.8 (b) . Recall that P(C; u) contains the set of all expectation vectors that satisfy optimality condition (SO) with respect to C. Hence, if a conguration C on fA; Tg is trim and (C; T) < 0, there is no expectation vector that satises (SO) with respect to C. This establishes (C2).
Next, suppose C is not trim. Then, we can nd a stretched subconguration C 0 of C which is minimal in the sense that no proper subconguration of C 0 is stretched. Hence, for generic utilities, there is a unique response mixed over A that induces u which is, in fact, the unique response mixed over \ C 0 A. Therefore, for generic utilities, if an equilibrium determines the conguration C, the responses to messages corresponding to bisupports in C 0 should be identical. This means that, for generic utilities, no equilibrium in C could be in reduced form.
Conclusively, i f C is not trim, in either case considered above, there is no reduced form equilibrium in C for generic utilities, which establishes (C1).
Consider a just conguration C on fA; Tg such that # C > # T. Since # A < # T for all (A; T) 2 C , ( C ; T ) < 0 is immediate from the denition of -value. Therefore, independently of whether C is trim or not, the game (A; T; ; u ; v ) has no reduced form equilibrium in C for generic u. Since this conclusion comes from the hypothesis that # C > # T, w e proved Theorem 2.2 (a).
Receiver's Optimality and Integrated Results
In the previous section, we eliminated certain congurations as being incompatible with the Sender's optimality condition (SO) for generic utilities. The congurations that survived this process are just congurations which are trim with non-negative -values. In this section, we i n v estigate the compatibility with the Receiver's optimality condition (RO) for these congurations and establish the main results of the paper.
Recall the second necessary condition (RO) for a conguration to have an equilibrium in it, namely, there is a talking strategy the posterior prole of which matches the conguration in the following sense: there is a one to one and onto mapping between the posterior prole and the bisupports of the conguration such that i) the support of each posterior belief is the type component of the matched bisupport and ii) the actions in each bisupport are best responses to the matched posterior belief. We l o o k i n to the utilities of the Receiver that satisfy this property. P osteriors are meaningful when they give nonnegative probabilities to all types. But, for expositional simplicity, the subsequent discussion is carried out in the ane extension of (T), that is, in H(T) f p 2 I R T : P t 2 T p t = 1 g : Given a game form (A; T; ), let C be a just conguration on fA; Tg. Suppose there is a talking strategy which satises (RO) with respect to C for a utility v of the Receiver.
Then, for each bisupport (A; T), generates a posterior which assigns zero probability t o t ypes not in T, and for which all actions in A are indierent to the Receiver. Since the underlying preference is an expected utility function, ((A; T); v) is an ane subspace of H(T). See Green and Osband (1991) for an extensive discussion of the structure of the state simplex in relation to the set of best responses when the underlying preference is expected utility representable. subset of V. Dene = \ C ( T 1 (F (A;T) )). Then, F is clearly generic in V and property i) is proved.
The dimension of the ane hull of two ane subspaces X and Y is at most dim X + dim Y + 1 . Applying this simple fact successively, the maximal possible dimension of (C; v) i s P C dim ((A; T); v) + # C 1. For v in F as dened above, this number is P C ( # T # A) + # C 1 = # T 1 ( C ; T ). This proves property ii).
For certain utilities of the Receiver, 2 (C; v) e v en if dim (C; v) < # T 1 so that (C; v) is a proper ane subspace of H(T). One question we are concerned here is whether these utilities are only exceptional in the sense that they form a negligible set. Suppose to the contrary, that is, dim (C; v) < # T 1 and 2 (C; v) for \almost all" utilities in a non-empty open subset of V. Then, for each of these utilities, \almost all" neighboring priors do not belong to (C; v), so that \almost all" neighboring priors do not have this property. In this sense, is special. However, this is contradictory to a nding due to next three Lemmas, namely, \all priors are equivalent in the sense that the set of utilities that satisfy (5:a) are identical for all priors up to certain rescaling of utility levels of the Receiver."
Given two priors and 0 in (T), dene f (; 0 ) : V ! V as follows: Denoting v 0 = f (; 0 ) (v), v 0 a t = ( t 0
